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I.

INTRODUCTION

Why do so-called consumer protection laws provide so little
actual protection?
In this article, we will first examine the current state of most
consumer protection legislation, exploring some reasons why the
laws have developed in this manner, and considering why
disclosures alone often do not – and cannot – provide meaningful
protection for consumers who most need it. We will then discuss
Minnesota Statutes Chapter 325N, a progressive law enacted in
2004 that substantively regulates foreclosure reconveyances, a
transaction often abused in a scam commonly known as “equity
stripping.” Finally, using Chapter 325N as a model, we will
consider other Minnesota consumer protection laws that could be
strengthened by the addition of similar substantive protections.
We hope that this article will cause readers to think about
†
Kristin Siegesmund is the supervising attorney of the Legal Aid Society of
Minneapolis consumer unit. She is a graduate of the University of Michigan Law
School and Brown University.
††
Leah Weaver is an Equal Justice Works Fellow at the Legal Aid Society of
Minneapolis. She is a graduate of William Mitchell College of Law and Carleton
College.
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those consumers most deserving and needing of protection from
scams, how our free market “caveat emptor” philosophy is failing
those consumers, and how we can provide stronger protections
while making the market a safer and fairer place for all consumers.
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION: CAVEAT EMPTOR
Governments have recognized the need to protect consumers
1
from abusive practices since before the time of Shakespeare.
Usury laws prohibiting unfairly high interest rates are perhaps the
2
oldest consumer protection laws, dating back to medieval times.
The heyday of consumer protection was in the 1960s and 1970s
when legislators passed numerous consumer protection laws at
3
both the state and federal levels. Minnesota currently has over
4
seventy-five consumer protection laws on its books, including a
5
usury law prohibiting interest above 8% on certain loans. Yet
6
despite all these protections, predatory practices abound. With so
much legislation, why are consumers still so vulnerable?
Very few consumer protection laws actually prohibit abusive
contract terms or exorbitant prices. Rather, the majority of these
laws simply mandate disclosures. For instance, Congress enacted
7
the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) “to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and
8
avoid the uninformed use of credit . . . .” To that end, TILA
1. See Elaine S. Tan, An Empty Shell? Rethinking the Usury Laws in Medieval
Europe, 23 J. LEGAL HIST. 177, 177 (2003). For a Shakespearean view of money
lenders, see WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3.
2. See Tan, supra note 1, at 177.
3. See, e.g., Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 1, 76 Stat. 780
(1962) (enacting sections 358–60, amending sections 321, 331, 332, 348, 351–53,
355, 357, 372, 374, 376, and 381, and enacting provisions set out as notes under
sections 321, 331, 332, 352, 355, 360, and 374); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601–19 (2000) (effective Apr. 11, 1968); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691 (2000) (effective Oct. 28, 1974).
4. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ch. 325F (2004), ch. 70A (2004), §§ 47.59–.60
(2004), 144A.4605 (2004), 155A.01 (2004), 184.33 (2004), 216B.098 (2004),
325G.17–.20 (2004), 325G.23–.28 (2004), 336A.02–.14 (2004), 386.375 (2004).
5. MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (2004).
6. See, e.g., STEVE TRIPOLI & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
DREAMS FORECLOSED: THE RAMPANT THEFT OF AMERICANS’ HOMES THROUGH EQUITYSTRIPPING FORECLOSURE “RESCUE” SCAMS (June 2005), http://www.consumerlaw.
org/news/ForeclosureReportFinal.pdf.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67 (2000).
8. Id. § 1601(a).
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requires lenders to make certain disclosures depending on the type
9
of credit extended, such as the annual percentage rate (APR), the
10
11
right to rescind, or the finance charge amount.
The Home
12
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) amends TILA
and provides additional protection for certain high-cost home
mortgage loans. While HOEPA prohibits a few especially abusive
13
14
terms, its primary effect is to require additional disclosures.
Most state consumer protection laws operate in a similar way.
They limit very few practices and rely primarily on disclosure of
essential terms. For instance, although lenders making short-term
unsecured loans under $350 are limited in their charges, the
15
permitted charges are astronomical when expressed as APRs.
Although the lenders must post notices informing borrowers that
they will pay high charges, nothing requires them to disclose these
16
charges as an APR. There is no limit on the amount a hotel may
charge its guests to make a local call, but the hotel must post a
notice “on or near each telephone” that states the amount of the
17
18
charge. While there are a few exceptions, consumer protection
laws typically boil down to caveat emptor – let the buyer beware.
Federal preemption of the area has stymied attempts by states,
including Minnesota, to impose more safeguards. States may not
pass laws that interfere with or weaken a federal regulatory scheme.
At one time, the preemption doctrine was interpreted as a floor.
States could add to, but could not take away from, protections that
federal regulations provided. But more recently, especially with the
rise of national banking, commercial interests have successfully
argued that it is too burdensome to comply with fifty different state
laws. States may attempt to regulate consumer areas, but if the
federal government steps in, typically much weaker regulations will
9. See, e.g., id. § 1637(c)(1)(A)(i).
10. Id. § 1635(a).
11. See, e.g, id. § 1638(a)(3).
12. Id. §§ 1602(aa), 1610, 1639–40.
13. See id. §§ 1639(c), (e)–(h) (prohibiting prepayment penalties, balloon
payments within five years of origination, negative amortization, prepaid
payments, and extending credit without regard for the consumer’s ability to pay).
14. Id. §§ 1639(a), (b).
15. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60(2) (2004). For example, a one-month loan of $50
may have a charge of $5.50 added to it, which equals an APR of 132%. Id. at
subdiv. (2)(a)(1).
16. Id. at subdiv. 4(e).
17. MINN. STAT. § 325F.99 (2004).
18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 325F.91 subdiv. 3 (2004) (limiting late fees in rentto-own agreements).
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preempt state legislation. Minnesota has attempted to protect
borrowers against usurious interest rates, but it can only do so for
19
loans not made by banks or other federally regulated lenders.
Minnesota formerly prohibited prepayment penalties on mortgage
loans but now generally allows them within certain parameters and
20
with certain disclosures.
Because most consumer legislation
touches on areas of interstate commerce, federal preemption of
state laws presents a huge bar to substantive regulation of
consumer transactions.
The primary reasons why consumer protection legislation
relies so heavily on disclosures instead of making substantive limits
are the American faith in the free market and Americans’ equal
distrust of big government regulation and paternalism. When
consumers are well informed, they supposedly have equal
bargaining power with other market participants, such as lenders
or merchants. The consumers can shop around, compare prices or
interest rates, and make the best decision, choosing to do business
with one merchant and not another. This comparison shopping
will influence lenders to compete for the consumers’ business by
offering lower rates and reduced fees and will entice merchants to
lower their prices. The market will fairly allocate risks and rewards.
Further, consumers are free to make choices. Unfortunately,
various factors can interfere with the free market’s regulatory
influence.
Those who see the market as an effective regulatory tool
assume that parties on both sides of the transaction – seller and
purchaser, or lender and borrower – make rational decisions. A
seller will not ask for more than a purchaser can afford, and a
lender will not loan more than a borrower can repay. But when the
impetus to make a rational decision is removed from one side of
the equation, that regulatory effect is removed. This may seem
farfetched, but it is exactly what has happened in mortgage lending
due to the influence of the secondary mortgage market.
Historically, the institution originating a mortgage loan
serviced it until the borrower paid off the loan. This meant that
the lenders had real incentive to underwrite their loans properly
and to ensure that borrowers could meet their obligations – if
19. See MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (2004) (“No person shall directly or indirectly
take or receive in money, goods, or things in action, or in any other way, any
greater sum, or any greater value, for the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or
things in action, than $8 on $100 for one year.”).
20. MINN. STAT. § 58.137 subdiv. 2 (2004).
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borrowers’ monthly payments were too high, they would default,
and the lender would be forced to foreclose on the property
securing the loan to recover any of its funds, an expensive
proposition. In the past twenty years, the emerging secondary
mortgage market has removed much of that incentive. Few
mortgage originators still service loans. Now, the originating
lender quickly sells the loans on the secondary mortgage market,
often to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).
Then, Fannie Mae pools and packages these loans into mortgage21
backed securities.
Finally, investors buy these securities, and
Fannie Mae uses the income from the sale of the securities to
22
purchase more loans from originators.
In theory, the resale of the loans benefits borrowers. Because
this practice quickly replenishes the lenders’ funds, especially in
rapidly growing areas, they are able to make more loans without
waiting thirty years for mortgagors to repay the funds; this should
23
keep costs and interest rates low, which will encourage borrowing.
However, the securitization of mortgages on the secondary
mortgage market has had a negative side effect. Instead of making
realistic predictions about a borrower’s ability to repay the loan, the
originator now encourages the borrower to take out the largest
amount for which it has approved him. The originator will be
repaid almost immediately when the loan has been packaged and
sold to Fannie Mae or another agency that issues mortgage-backed
securities. Instead of considering the borrower’s long-term ability
to repay the loan, the originator now hopes only to make as much
money as possible in the short-term. Any incentive to make a
realistic loan – as opposed to pushing the consumer to borrow as
much money as she possibly can – has been removed by the
planned resale of the loan on the secondary mortgage market. Put
another way, a profitable and therefore commercially reasonable
loan for a mortgage originator can now include a loan anticipated
to fail from the beginning. Thus, the effect of risk for the lender
has lost any meaningful regulatory impact. To avoid abuses and
21. JEAN CUMMINGS & DENISE DIPASQUALE, CITY RESEARCH, A PRIMER ON THE
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 5 (June 4, 1997), http://www.cityresearch.com/
pres/smm.pdf. The process of pooling mortgages and packaging them into
mortgage backed securities is called “securitization.” See U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (Feb. 11, 2003), http://
www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm.
22. CUMMINGS & DIPASQUALE, supra note 21, at 5.
23. Id. at 4, 8.
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unreasonable loans, the borrower must rely heavily on disclosures
when deciding whether to accept or reject offered terms. However,
these disclosures do not work.
For disclosures to be meaningful, the consumer must be able
to read, understand, and appreciate the information disclosed. A
real problem occurs when individuals receiving the disclosures do
not understand them. This can happen for a number of reasons –
for example, everyone is familiar with the credit card disclosures
printed in a font size almost too small to be legible. And
disclosures are often written in complicated legalese. For instance,
many individuals do not understand the difference between a
24
simple interest rate and an APR. Other disclosures are vague or
not written in a way that is meaningful. Although Minnesota
payday lenders must post notices informing borrowers that they will
pay high charges, the law does not require that these charges be
25
disclosed as interest or as an APR. While tiny fonts and terms of
art can ruin a disclosure’s effectiveness, they are not the only
problem.
A consumer’s poor English language or reading skills can also
render disclosures meaningless and prevent him from
understanding the warning. Few consumer protection laws require
disclosures in languages other than English, even if the parties
conduct the transaction in another language. Some statutes
intending to provide clearly written, easily understood disclosures
mandate the content of the disclosure, along with font size and
prominent display. However, mandating the content could reduce
its effectiveness for non-English speakers by prohibiting language
access. For instance, some lenders solicit loans by mailing live
checks to individuals; endorsing and cashing the checks constitutes
acceptance of the loan terms. Minnesota Statutes Section 47.605
24. “Interest rate” typically refers to simple interest, computed on the original
face amount of the loan. A $100 loan with a 5% interest rate would result in $5 of
interest charges in the specified time period. APR is intended to express the true
cost of credit, and includes finance charges and fees as well as interest charges. 12
C.F.R. § 226.22(a)(1) (2006). One way to calculate APR is the Newton-Raphson
method. Loan amount = C, extra costs = E, interest rate = r, months of the loan =
N. First, figure the monthly loan payment (P) as follows: P = [(C+E)r(1+r)N]/
N
[(1+r) – 1]. Then using that figure, solve for APR A (a = A/1200) as follows:
[a(1+a)N /(1+a)N – 1] – P/C = 0. Got it? Different formulas apply depending on
whether the credit is open-end (as in a revolving line of credit) or closed-end (as
in a mortgage loan), and can be found in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. section 226
appendices F, J (2006).
25. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60 subdiv. 4(e) (2004).
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regulates these loan solicitations, mandating certain disclosures
with the intent of helping consumers understand the effect of
cashing the check. But a translated notice advising “ESTA ES UNA
SOLICITUD PARA UN PRÉSTAMO – LEA LAS SIGUIENTES
CLÁUSULAS ADJUNTAS ANTES DE FIRMAR Y CAMBIAR ESTE
CHEQUE” would likely better serve Spanish speakers, responding
to a letter written in Spanish, than would the English statement
“THIS IS A SOLICITATION FOR A LOAN – READ THE
ENCLOSED DISCLOSURES BEFORE SIGNING AND CASHING
26
THIS CHECK” that the current law requires.
The market’s regulatory influence depends on well-informed
consumers who shop around in order to make the best choice
possible. Consumers may enter into less than optimal agreements
because they do not know that they have other options or because
meaningful options are not available to them.
The Center for Responsible Lending recently released a study
analyzing the effect of race and ethnicity on home mortgage loan
rates. This study, using data that lenders released under the Home
27
Mortgage Disclosure Act,
showed that African-American
borrowers are significantly more likely to receive a high-rate, subprime home mortgage loan than white borrowers, even controlling
for credit scores and other factors legitimately affecting interest
28
rates. Similarly, the study found that Latino borrowers were also
far more likely to receive higher interest rates than white borrowers
– in the case of fixed-rate purchase loans without prepayment
29
penalties, 142% more likely. The free market is not working for
these borrowers to provide the best loans possible because
discriminatory underwriting and pricing practices have intervened.
Similarly, the free market disserves the borrower who does not
have the time or collateral to avail herself of conventional lending.
Small, short-term, unsecured loans, often called “payday” loans, are
30
subject to only minimal regulation and disclosure requirements,
but these disclosures often do not matter. Consumers entering
into these transactions must be aware that the interest rates are
high, but these are not loans for those with good credit and
26. See MINN. STAT. § 47.605 subdiv. 3(b) (2004).
27. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–10 (2000).
28. DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE
AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 16 (May 31, 2006), available
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr011-Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf.
29. Id. at 18.
30. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60 (2004).
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collateral. Individuals teetering on the edge of financial crisis, who
need the money to pay the rent or buy food, are often the ones
who obtain these loans. With few, if any, real options available,
disclosures do not make a difference. If a person has no collateral
and faces a choice between taking out a payday loan at an APR over
100% or being evicted for nonpayment of rent, the loan will be the
clear choice. Although these loans typically have small principal
amounts, their effect on an individual’s or family’s finances can be
huge. Consumers in tight financial circumstances often cannot
afford to pay the loan off in just two weeks and will either roll the
loan over or pay off the loan with another; one study found that the
31
average payday loan borrower has eleven loans per year.
A
32
Minnesota borrower would pay $23 in fees for a $300 payday loan.
Rolled over eleven times, the fees would total $253, and the
borrower would still owe the original $300. The Center for
Responsible Lending estimated in 2003 that predatory payday
33
lending costs consumers $3.4 billion annually.
Given that the
payday lending industry more than doubled between the years 2000
34
and 2003 and has shown no signs of slowing its growth, it stands to
reason that 2006 borrowers will pay far more than $3.4 billion to
payday lenders.
Disclosures are not enough. Legal terms are too abstruse even
for most literate Americans. The risk/reward system that would
regulate some lender behavior has become unhinged, providing
reward for commercially unreasonable loans with virtually no risk
to the lender. And the free market premise that consumers have
full knowledge and free choice is seriously flawed because of
economic realities and discrimination. Vulnerable consumers need
more protection to give them equal footing with merchants and
lenders in the marketplace.
III. MINNESOTA STATUTES CHAPTER 325N
Minnesota Statutes Chapter 325N is unusual in that few other
states regulate the transactions that the codes define as “foreclosure

31. KEITH ERNST ET AL., QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY
PAYDAY LENDING 3–4, 8 (Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.responsiblelending
.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf.
32. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60 subdiv. 2(4) (2004).
33. ERNST, supra note 31, at 7–8.
34. Id. at 2.
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35

reconveyances.” And it is also unusual, however, when compared
to other consumer protection laws in that it actually provides
substantive protections – limiting consumers’ losses and capping
purchasers’ profits from these transactions.
Prior to the Minnesota State Legislature’s enacting Chapter
325N, the foreclosure reconveyances were unregulated and easily
abused. Although they can take several forms, there is a basic
pattern that most of these transactions follow.
First, a homeowner with a significant amount of equity in the
home misses one or more mortgage payments, and the lender
begins the foreclosure process. One of the first steps of this process
36
is publication of a notice of the lender’s intent to foreclose. This
notice, which the lender must publish for at least six weeks, must
include the mortgagor’s name, the address of the mortgaged
property, the original principal amount, the date of the loan, and
37
the amount that the lender claims is due. When an investor crossreferences these publications against public property records listing
such things as other recorded liens or judgments and countyassessed market value, it is easy to determine which homeowners
facing foreclosure have substantial equity in their homes.
Once the investor has found homeowners with significant
equity remaining, the investor will approach them offering various
types of assistance. Offers of help may range from a quick purchase
of the home for cash to refinancing the homeowner’s mortgage. If
the homeowner wants to try to keep the home, as is often the case,
the investor may enter into a reconveyance with the homeowner.
The homeowner temporarily sells the home to the investor,
allegedly for the purpose of securing financing to pay off the
foreclosing lender. The investor allows the homeowner to stay in
the property and buy it back at a price that covers the loan, the
investor’s fees, and other costs.
As an example, assume a homeowner purchased her home ten
35. California (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1695–1695.17, 2945–2945.11), Georgia (GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-393 subdiv. (b)(20)(A)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.
§ 7-301-321), and Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.935–.943) are the other states
that regulate some aspect of foreclosure reconveyance transactions. Maryland’s
law is the most similar to Minnesota’s Chapter 325N.
36. See MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (2004) (requiring that “[s]ix weeks published
notice shall be given that such mortgage will be foreclosed by sale of the
mortgaged premises, or some part thereof, and at least four weeks before the
appointed time of the sale a copy of such notice shall be served upon the person
in possession of the mortgaged premises, if the same are actually occupied.”).
37. Id. §§ 580.03–.04 (2004).
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years ago and owes $70,000 on her mortgage. Her home has
appreciated over time, and it is now worth $200,000, giving her
$130,000 in home equity. The homeowner loses her job and falls
behind on her $600 monthly mortgage payment as she searches for
new employment. If she sold the home for a fair price, she could
expect to walk away from the closing with over $100,000 after
realtor fees and closing costs. But she may not want to move, or
she may not be able to find suitable housing that is less expensive
than the mortgage payment she could not meet. These situations
lead homeowners to enter into foreclosure reconveyances.
In a straightforward foreclosure reconveyance transaction, the
investor first purchases the home, paying off the foreclosed loan
and any other liens. The purchase price may be set slightly higher
than the total amount owed on the home to cover closing costs and
to allow the homeowner to receive some cash at the closing. Then,
typically in the same transaction, the investor conveys an interest in
the home back to the homeowner, often either with a contract for
deed or a lease with a purchase option. If done fairly, this
arrangement allows the homeowner to make affordable payments
to the investor and repurchase the home after a set amount of
time, with the investor receiving a higher price than she paid for
the home as a return on her investment. In our hypothetical, the
homeowner could sell her home to the investor for $80,000. This
would pay off her foreclosed loan, cover closing costs, and even
give her some cash from the transaction. The homeowner would
continue to live in the home, making payments for a year or two to
the investor, while she finds new employment and cleans up her
credit. Then, at the end of the predetermined time period, she
could repurchase the home from the investor for $100,000. This
would allow the investor almost $20,000 profit after closing costs.
In a typical equity skimming transaction, the unscrupulous
investor sets the purchase price as high as possible and then obtains
a mortgage for nearly the full value of the home. The homeowner
receives no proceeds, which instead go to the investor to pay the
investor’s fees and to pay costs in the future. The investor also sets
the lease or contract payments much higher than the homeowner
can afford. When this happens, the homeowner will inevitably
default on the payments. The investor can then evict the
homeowner in a summary housing court proceeding and resell the
home for fair market value – pocketing the homeowner’s equity
and leaving the homeowner with nothing.
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In our hypothetical, imagine an unscrupulous investor who,
instead of purchasing the property for $80,000, purchases it for
$200,000 and places a $160,000 mortgage on the property. The
homeowner sees no proceeds from this sale, which allegedly should
net the homeowner $130,000. Why not? The investor uses the
proceeds of the $160,000 to pay off the $70,000 loan in foreclosure
and inflated closing costs of $30,000. The investor is paid a fee of
$36,000. The investor puts the remaining money into an “escrow
account,” where questionable costs and management fees quickly
drain the balance. Imagine if our hypothetical investor then
required monthly payments hundreds of dollars more than those
on the foreclosed loan. What options would be available to the
homeowner? How could she possibly hope to complete the
reconveyance and regain full title to her home?
This clear potential for abuse led to the Legislature’s
regulation of foreclosure reconveyances. In addition to its typical
consumer protection provisions, such as requiring written
38
39
contracts and a five-day right to cancel, and even strengthening
40
its disclosures by requiring language access, Chapter 325N also
sets substantive limits on several terms of the reconveyance
transaction. First, before entering into the transaction, the
purchaser must verify the homeowner’s ability to complete the
reconveyance – both by making the monthly lease or contract
41
payments and by making the final re-purchase.
The statute
creates the presumption of affordability if the monthly payments,
along with other listed housing expenses, do not exceed 60% of the
42
homeowner’s monthly gross income. If the homeowner is unable
to complete the reconveyance despite these provisions, the statute
requires that the investor pay the homeowner 82% of the fair
market value of the home, minus expenses, within 150 days of the
43
homeowner’s eviction or voluntary move-out.
In addition to
limiting the investor’s fee to 18% of the fair market value, this
38. MINN. STAT. §§ 325N.03, .11 (2004).
39. MINN. STAT. §§ 325N.02, .13 (2004).
40. MINN. STAT. §§ 325N.03(c), .11 (2004).
41. MINN. STAT. § 325N.17(a)(1) (2004).
42. Id. Housing expenses in the 60% calculation include “payments for
regular principal, interest, rent, utilities, hazard insurance, real estate taxes, and
association dues.” Id.
43. MINN. STAT. § 325N.17(b)(2) (2004). For accounting forms showing how
to calculate the payment to the homeowner and what expenses she may deduct
from that 82% figure, see http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/housing/
HomeOwnerPaymentAccountingForms.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
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provision also ensures that homeowners do not lose the entire
value of the equity that they worked to build prior to foreclosure.
Compliance with Chapter 325N would dramatically change the
outcome of our second hypothetical above. The investor would be
required to verify the homeowner’s income before entering into an
agreement with her. A contract, written in the same language used
by the parties when negotiating the deal, would memorialize the
terms of their agreement, and the homeowner would have five
business days after signing the contract to change her mind. If she
were unable to complete the reconveyance, she would receive 82%
of fair market value, $164,000, less reasonable costs such as
satisfying her mortgage and paying closing costs. She would take
away at least $64,000 in equity, and the investor would still receive
her fee of 18% of fair market value, $36,000. Both parties benefit
from the transaction, instead of one party – the original
homeowner – receiving practically nothing.
Foreclosures and foreclosure reconveyance transactions are
not unique to Minnesota, but Chapter 325N is an unusual law that
passed under unusual circumstances. Since 1980, the prevalent
mood favoring deregulation and reliance on market forces has
thwarted new consumer protection legislation. But events in 2004
converged to allow the passage of this new law.
The Minnesota State Legislature passed Chapter 325N amid
44
great publicity about the problem of equity stripping. Much of
this publicity was due to the actions of Attorney General Mike
Hatch, who filed suit against three of the state’s largest equity
45
stripping scammers. The Attorney General’s suit against one of
the companies, HJE Financial, LLC, helped provide the political
pressure necessary for the bill’s passage through the Legislature.
Moreover, one of the company’s principals, Ron Esau, had served
46
as Governor Tim Pawlenty’s campaign treasurer. This created a
unique political climate with pressure for both parties to support
tougher laws.
44. See, e.g., Sheila Mulrooney Eldred, Stripped Clean, CITY PAGES (MinneapolisSt. Paul), July 21, 2004, at 11; Neal Gendler, Lender’s License Suspended, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), May 21, 2004, at 1D; Nolan Zavoral, Rally Targets St. Paul Real Estate
Firm, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 15, 2003, at 5B.
45. State v. Grant Holding, LLC, No. C6-03-12006 (Ramsey County (MN) D.
Ct. filed 2003); State v. HJE Fin., LLC, No. 03-CV-5554-JNE/JSM (D. Minn. filed
Oct. 2003); State v. Home Funding Corp., No. C4-03-7691 (Dakota County (MN)
D. Ct. filed Apr. 28, 2003).
46. Pat Doyle, State Fines Pawlenty Campaign Treasurer, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 24, 2005, at 7B.
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At this point in time, it is impossible to tell what the long-term
effects of Chapter 325N’s substantive provisions will be. As of this
writing, the statute has been in effect less than two years. No
published case law on Chapter 325N exists, and few cases are
proceeding. The only case dealing with Chapter 325N that has
come before the Minnesota Court of Appeals presented the
question of housing court jurisdiction over evictions with Chapter
47
325N counter-claims and defenses. No analysis or commentary
has been published addressing whether the statute’s substantive
restrictions would unreasonably chill the private investor market.
There is strong reason to believe that the substantive terms
and limits in Chapter 325N will have a positive effect for all parties
involved in the transaction. The statute recognizes that this type of
financing arrangement is riskier than conventional loans. While
not dictating terms or banning significant financial rewards to
investors, the statute provides reasonable limits to curtail predatory
practices. Because the statute limits a foreclosed homeowner’s
monthly payment to 60% of monthly gross income, individuals
entering in to these transactions truly stand a chance of
48
repurchasing their homes.
If the reconveyance fails and the
foreclosed homeowner moves out, or if the investor evicts her from
the home, both parties still benefit. Homeowners with significant
equity will not lose everything. Investors’ and brokers’ profits are
limited, but at 18% of fair market value, profits can be substantial
49
while still complying with the statute. If the parties later disagree
about the fairness of the transaction, the statute removes discretion
from the court and instead imposes clear guidelines to assist the
court in deciding whether the terms are reasonable. Chapter 325N
provides a model for a statute that offers objective guidelines to
curb abuses while still allowing significant room for investors and
homeowners to negotiate the terms and benefits of the transaction.
IV. CONSUMERS WOULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIVE
PROTECTIONS
The substantive limits in Chapter 325N clearly benefit
foreclosed homeowners, foreclosure purchasers, and foreclosure
47. Real Estate Equity Strategies, LLC v. Jones, 720 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2006).
48. MINN. STAT. § 325N.17(a)(1) (2004).
49. See MINN. STAT. § 325N.17(b)(2) (2004). See also hypothetical supra Part
III.
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consultants. If legislators used this chapter as a model, they could
make any number of other consumer protection laws stronger by
the addition of similar substantive limits.
A.

Fees for Late Rent: Define and Limit “Reasonable.”

One area that could benefit from more objective guidelines
and limits is late fees in residential leases. Minnesota Statutes
Chapter 504B governs landlord-tenant relationships. This chapter
addresses various rights and responsibilities, including mutual
50
covenants against allowing unlawful activity, a tenant’s right to
51
52
privacy, and shared utility meters. However, nowhere does the
chapter discuss the issue of fees for late payment of rent. Over the
years, Minnesota courts have determined that late fees are
permissible when they take the form of reasonable liquidated
53
damages, and not a penalty. The fees must be reasonable and not
54
disproportionate to actual damages. Unfortunately, the failure to
provide objective guidance has led to abuse.
Many leases have late fee policies that, on their face, bear no
relation to actual damages and are therefore illegal penalties.
Some leases have ratcheting fees – for example, $5 a day for every
day rent is late. A tenant who pays her $800 rent twenty days late
might owe $100 in late fees. A landlord with a 10% mortgage
would have incurred only $4 in interest lost. The fee has no
relation to the cost that the landlord actually bears from the late
payment. Other leases charge large late fees regardless of how
much money is late. A low-income tenant in subsidized housing
whose portion of the rent is only $41 could face a $50 late fee when
her rent is late. This situation can snowball when a lease requires
that payments apply first to late fees, then to rent. So in the
example of the subsidized tenant, if she pays her $41 rent on time
the next month, but has no money for the late fee, she incurs a
second $50 charge and now owes $100. Such a situation can – and
does – quickly lead to eviction and homelessness. Creating limits
similar to those in Chapter 325N would curb abuse.
50. MINN. STAT. § 504B.171 (2004).
51. MINN. STAT. § 504B.211 (2004).
52. MINN. STAT. § 504B.215 (2004).
53. See Local 34, State, County & Mun. Employees v. County of Hennepin,
310 Minn. 283, 288, 246 N.W.2d 41, 44 (1976); Palace Theatre, Inc. v. Nw.
Theatres Circuit, Inc., 186 Minn. 548, 553, 243 N.W. 849, 851 (1932).
54. Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 481–82, 99 N.W.2d 69, 74–75
(1959).
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Providing a dollar limit for late fees and an objective definition
of a reasonable charge would not be excessive regulation.
Therefore, limiting late fees to a set amount or to the landlord’s
actual damages, such as lost interest or administrative costs, would
be a simple way to protect tenants against inflated fees that
constitute a penalty without placing a heavy burden on landlords.
B. Payday Loans: Disclose, and Limit, the APR.
Minnesota state law regulates short-term, unsecured (often
called “payday”) loans, but only loosely. It caps APRs, but at an
55
astronomical 390%.
And while the law requires various
disclosures, it does not require the lender to disclose the loan’s
56
California is currently working to cap
APR to the borrower.
57
interest rates on such loans at 36%. A similar effort in Minnesota
to cap APRs at a reasonable amount, combined with an APR
disclosure requirement, would level the playing field without
destroying the lender’s profit incentive. Such requirements would
help consumers understand the terms of their loans, dissuade
borrowers who could do without the expensive loans, protect
consumers with few options aside from the payday loans, and at
36% – more than four times the usury rate in Minnesota – still
provide a substantial profit to investors. Setting limits would allow
this market to continue to operate profitably, but with fewer
incidents of abuse.
V. CONCLUSION
Minnesota’s Chapter 325N is an unusual consumer protection
statute that provides substantive protections for homeowners
entering into foreclosure reconveyance transactions.
This
legislation protects parties on both sides of the transaction – it
provides foreclosed homeowners with genuine protection against
foreclosure rescue scams, allowing them a real chance at
55. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdivs. 1, 2 (2004) (outlining the various fee
levels that are permitted for loans of up to $350). For calculation of APR, see
supra note 24. See also Consumer Federation of America, Safe Harbor for Usury:
Recent Developments in Payday Lending (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.
consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf; Wisconsin State Legislature, Legislative
Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Briefs (July 2000), available at http://www.legis.state.
wi.us/lrb/pubs/wb/00wb7.pdf.
56. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdiv. 4 (2004). See also supra Part II.
57. Tony Perry, Targeting “Predator Lenders,” L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2006, at B6.
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repurchasing their homes, all while giving foreclosure consultants
and purchasers clear guidelines on how to structure the
transactions. The chapter sets limits that allow for a substantial
profit while still ensuring that the transaction is commercially
reasonable for the consumer. If it can avoid federal preemption,
this legislation could be a model for reforming other consumer
protection statutes to provide meaningful protections.
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